PREVIEW OF A JUSTICE by HAMILTON, WALTON
PREVIEW OF A JUSTICE
By WALTON HAMILTON t
A MAN writes - an event transpires - the work is reset to another
theme. Felix Frankfurter scribbles about 'Mr. Justice Holmes; an ad-
vance sheaf of the opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is sought within
his pages. Thus circumstance interposes to transmute what was to have
been a review of a book into a preview of a justice.
To search his printed word for the judge-to-be is a revealing adventure.
Apropos of Holmes, Frankfurter speaks for himself.' On otler occasions
he has written about Mfarshall, Taney and Waite, about MLr. Justice
Brandeis3 and Mfr. Justice Cardozo.4 In reciting what oler jurists have
done, he cannot escape what he as a jurist might do. In attention to legal
events of yesterday, he addresses himself to issues now current.' A
gallery of affectionate portraits reveals less of judgments to come than
would an exhibition from the judicial workshop; and we may anticipate
less clearly the concretions which to Frankfurter will be the Constitution
than we could with Holmes and with Cardozo.' But the new justice lives
in a democracy; he has freely chosen his gods. His pieces are apprecia-
tions rather than critical appraisals; his selection and comment have remade
his subjects; another choice of items and a different text would have
' Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. FRANKFURTER, 'MR. JusTIcE HoLMEs AND THE SPRaEMn CourR (1938). This
work is cited below as "On Holmes II." A former essay on Mr. Justice Holnes and the
Constitution (1927) 41 Hxv. L. R,. 121, reprinted in MR. Jusrrcc HoLmEs (1931)
46-177, is cited as "On Holmes I."
2. FRAXNKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MfARSuALL, T.ANE- AND WAIYE
(1937). Cited below, save for the introductory chapter, as "On Marshall," "On Taney:"
and "On Waite," respectively.
3. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution (1931) 45 HAnt. L Rsx.
33, reprinted in MR. JusTic BRAxDEIS (1932) 47-126. Cited below as "On Brandei:'
4. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law (1939) 48 Y=aug L. J. 453,
39 COL. L. REv. 88, 52 HARV. L. RE%% 440. Cited below as "On Cardozo."
5. At public hearings on his appointment, Mr. Frankfurter informed the judiciary
Committee of the United States Senate that his opinions are matter of open record. A
little diligence in probing into his published work would have given the Committee far
greater knowledge about the "views" he brings to his office than its public hearings
were able to elicit.
6. "Barring only Holmes, no man has ever so completely revealed the map of his
mind before he went on the Court as had Cardozo. If surprise there was in anything he
wrote as a justice, it was not for want of disclosure by him as to the way he looked at
questions that would come before him" On Cardozo. 48 YALE L. J. 459. 39 Cor. L Ry.
89, 52 HARx L. REv. 441. The same can be said of Frankfurter, with the important pru-
viso that his views have been put on record as a personal expression, not as responsei
to questions in the litigious setting in which a judge meets them. It need hardly be added,
even for the lay reader, that such a difference in the form of the question is of utm¢,st
importance.
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created another Marshall, Holmes or Brandeis.' In citation, comment,
concurrence we catch the potential jurist within the writer. In respect to
fellow members of his craft, Felix Frankfurter recites his faith."
The office to which Frankfurter has been called is of its own kind.
In form it is judicial; matters of litigation, great and small, converge
there. In essence it is as definitely set within the political order and the
national economy as in the judicial system. In our scheme of things its
function is to mediate between the individual and the government and
to mark the boundaries between state and national action.0 Its character
as a court restates the questions of policy brought before it; its exercise
of statesmanship is hemmed in by the restrictions attending the adjudica-
tory process."0 It must attend to its task within the confined procedures of
a lawsuit; the general problem is presented in a mutilated form and with-
out facts adequate to its full understanding. It rarely has a chance at
an issue whole and complete; it must do its work with the uncreative
resources of judicial review." Its constructive drive is compromised by
the accidents of unrelated and intermittent cases, the confinement of issues
to the legal record, the limited learning and insight of counsel fortuitously
selected, the necessity of imprisoning the judgment within legal limita-
tions and past utterances. 12 In all its work it is confronted with an inter-
play of legal doctrines with political and industrial forces."5 Yet, in spite
of judicial trappings and usage, the court cannot escape its compromised
office as an arbiter of policy. 14
To Frankfurter the court is at once an abstraction, a fiction and an
aggregate of individuals acting within an institutional frame-work.' His
accent falls in reiterated beat, not upon the bench, but upon its personnel.
It does make a difference who is numberd among the elect. It would
deny all meaning to history to believe that the course of human events
would have been the same if Kenyon rather than Mansfield, Spencer Roane
7. Of the essays Marshall, Taney and Waite have more of a critical note than
Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo. He states that Holmes almost accepted the simplicities of
the wage-fund theory and that in a question of federal immunity from state taxation
Holmes "was himself caught in this web of unrealities." On Holme., II, p. 85. But,
such minor flaws aside, neither the frailties nor even the human traits of his later jurists
are passed in review.
8. In the paragraphs that follow I have attempted, so far as a running account will
allow, to express Mr. Frankfurter's views in his own words. The pages that follow are
replete with phrases, clauses, even occasional sentences from these essays. Except where
his idiom is distinctively unique, quotation marks have been omitted; to include all would
veritably be to sprinkle the paragraphs with them. As atonement for the omission and as
a reference for the critical reader, a series of footnotes provides, point by point, a ready
reference to the Frankfurter text.
9. On Holmes II, p. 5. 10. On Marshall, p. 22.
11. On Waite, p. 96; On Marshall, p. 71. 12. On Marshall, p. 22.
13. On Marshall, p. 26. 14. On Taney, p. 58.
15. On Holmes II, p. 8.
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rather than John Marshall, Roscoe Conkling rather than Mt irrison Waite
had been accorded high office.1" It was a realization that the man is father
to the jurist which led Theodore Roosevelt to set do ,wn the hopes and
doubts he felt about Ir. Justice Holmes." A power tu determine doctrine
often falls to a single judge; that Marshall was there anJl Taney and
Cardozo - and not others - has shaped the very fabric of the Constitu-
tion."8 All of heredity and culture, of impulse and reaction, that go into
personality pass on into legal opinion. Against individual preference not
even the higher law is insulated.
His pioneer task demands of the jurist a severe fitness. He must have
the capacity to assimilate, modify and reject the discursive and subtly
partisan arguments of counsel. He must be able to transmute the raw
materials of record and argument into an enduring opinion; yet remain
consciously aware of his own intellectual processes."0 Above all a happy
resource must enable him to reconcile confused aims and conflicting
pressures within the frame-work of a legal formula."' So exacting a
competence cannot be reduced to specifications. No man can apply the
Constitution as a linear measure to a statute to discover whether it be
valid or void;21 no formula will make great judges of little men.- The
jurist must dwell above the sound of passing shibboleths, yet not regard
our highest tribunal as a Grand Lama.2 4 He must be able to discover
the vital in the undramatic.2 5 It is men-with their diversities in endow-
ment, experience, outlook-who direct the path of the law. -G There is
no inevitability in history except as men make it.2-
Individuals make it up, yet the court is a court. Its members act within
the network of its usages and traditions. As a court they make decisions
and lay down doctrines. In time they give way to successors who do not
build anew, but refine, modify, reinterpret, transmute, pass on the
heritage.28 No judge writes on a wholly clean slate ;' lie must live within
the intellectual climate generated by his brothers on the bench. Whoever
the spokesman, the Court imparts to its opinions the distinction of its
own accent. Even Marshall, who invented "the opinion of the Court,"
spoke as a member of a bench. The idea that he dominated leaves out of the
reckoning the strong personalities of his brethren. Mr. Justice Johnson's
opinions reveal a tough-mindedness; M\r. Justice Story had "devotion to
Marshall, but also vanity and views." To Frankfurter the wisdom of the
16. On Holmes II, p. 9; THE COMMERCE CLUSE UNDER MnSHLL, T%:.E-" Ai
WVAIE (1937) 4.
17. On Holmes II, p. 21. 18. On Marshall, p. 44.
19. On Marshall, p. 43. 20. On Taney, p. 65.
21. On Holmes II, p. 8. 22. On Marshall, p. 32.
23. On Holmes I, p. 118; Holmes II, p. 93. 24. On Holmes 1, p. 118.
25. On Holmes II, p. 28. 26. On Holmes II, p. 8.
27. On Holmes II, p. 9. 28. On Holmes II, p. 9.
29. On Marshall, p. 12.
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group has a value above the wisdom of the individual. The individual
may be bold, the court must be wary. The individual can afford to be
outspoken, the court must consolidate its position step by step and realize
its strategy in a series of decisions.30 Inner conviction or outward cir-
cumstance may at times allow to a jurist no outlet save in dissenting
opinion.31 But quite as often individual preference must yield before the
prevailing temper of the bench.32 In general the voice of the court must
be "an orchestral and not a solo performance. 133
The work goes forward under the aegis of the great tradition. The
past must converge upon the instant case, the future lead out from it.
An attitude which only an experience with the annals of man can impart
must be omnipotent. As docket follows docket, germs of opinion are to
be converted into constitutional doctrine. In the process many notions,
indulged for the moment, prove abortive, while enduring life is assured
to others. The judges, even the great judges of the past, lived in their
times, not in ours. Their tentative gropings must not be turned into
obscuring formulas or traps for retrospective interpretation.34 Ideas have
their genealogies;5 a holding has fortuitous as well as intended conse-
quences ;" and, where there is fumbling and growth, we must not expect
consistency in detail.3" Law is an aspect of our cultural history; its forms
are related to its functions ;38 doctrines that no longer serve must melt
away in the light of later experience.3 If he is not to be imprisoned by
the rags and tags of learning, the judge needs the sweep of vision which
a sense of time imparts. "Today we study the day before yesterday, in
order that yesterday may not paralyze today, and today may not paralyze
tomorrow."4 In fact civilization is nothing more than a sequence of new
tasks. 1
The perspective of history makes the judge mindful of the limited range
of human foresight.4 2 Frankfurter does not deny authority to the world's
30. On Marshall, p. 25.
31. One who has lived long with opinions and has studied the divisions within the
court can discover the influence of individual judges in the common product. Tim Com.
MIERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937) 8. He also becomes con-
scious of the fortuitous circumstances which shape a majority opinion. On Brandeis, p.
74. It is, however, "a teasing mystery" how a judge, satisfied with the result, yield,
concurrence in an opinion which presents uncongenial doctrine. On Taney, p. 56.
32. On Marshall, p. 43. 33. Ibid.
34. THE COmmERcE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937) 9-10;
On Marshall, p. 32.
35. Quoting James Bradley Thayer in THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,
TANEY AND WAITE (1937) 4.
36. On Taney, p. 66. 37. On Marshall, p. 18.
38. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 477, 39 COL. L. REV. 107, 52 1-ARv. L. REv. 450.
39. THE CO-MAERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937) 6.
40. Quoting Maitland, in THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER 'MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE (1937) 3.
41. On Brandeis, p. 124. 42. On Brandeis, pp. 105, 124.
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most powerful court ;43 instead he pleads for self-restraint in its exercise.
Thus on occasion it was a flaw in Taney that the temptation to express
right views broke through an attitude of judicial reserve;4 and Waite
fulfilled one of the greatest duties of a judge, the duty not to enlarge his
authority." The court is the brake on other men's actions, the judge of
other men's decisions.40 But no words on parchment will suffice to per-
form the office, "for clauses are not truly censors, the men who apply
them are." Judges must not become builders of policy;' T even the absence
of legislation does not create a vacuum for judicial architecture. s Judicial
action has its obverse in judicial limitation. 9 The whole of the question
may not be before the court; the specific claim may be enmeshed in larger
public issues; a suitable remedy may exceed its resources. Even the law is
only partially in the keeping of the judiciary.10 Thus judicial restraint is
set in the very nature of the judicial process. A recognition of the rational
limits of its competence is not an abdication of the court's power.5
Another source of restraint is a critical attitude towards the judicial
process. Here the text is from the gospel according to Holmes that "we
should think things and not words." 02 Discretion is a function, not of
mechanics, but of imponderables . 3 So no verbal formula, no sanctifying
phrases, can provide an escape from judgment. 4 'Marshall's decisions
may be rooted in principles, but, blessed with a gift for empiricism, he
was pragmatic in their application." The ad hoc tends to become the
universal; what judges say, even as asides, has an influence upon what
they do next; the rule, no matter how halting, projects the present into
the future."6 So a caveat is alvays in order lest the words be over-large,
the saying over bold. A glory of the common law is its disrespect for
dicta; in constitutional cases side-remarks are pernicious usurpers; to let
accumulated dicta govern is to deny the future a hearing!?7 In short it
is a parlous adventure to tame instances into a general rule 03s
43. On Brandeis, p. 125. 44. On Taney, p. 72.
45. On Waite, p. 80. 46. On Holmes II, p. 30.
47. On Holmes II, p. 25. 48. On Brandeis, p. 98.
49. On Waite, p. 95. 50. On Brandeis, p. Q.
51. It is interesting to note that in all these essays Mfr. Frankfurter preaches the
gospel of judicial self-restraint, but nowhere commits himself to an abridgement of
judicial power.
52. On Holmes II, p. 57.
53. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 459, 39 COL L. REv. 89, 52 HARv. L rEv. 441.
54. On Taney, p. 53; On Waite, p. 87.
55. It was only when Mfarshall's statements were turned into obscuring formulas by
minds less sensitive to practical exigencies of government that issues were confused and
evaded. On Marshall, pp. 14, 31.
56. On Marshall, p. 26. 57. On Brandeis, p. 10?.
58. On Brandeis, p. 52. His skepticism of verbalisms frees Frankfurter from the
tyranny of stare decisis. If holdings are to be read, not as general rules, but in the light
of their particulars, the past may be invoked as experience rather than as compulsion.
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Logic alone is sterile. Frankfurter knows, as well as Holmes or
Brandeis, "how slender a reed" is reason-how recent its emergence in
man, how powerful the countervailing instincts and passions, how treach-
erous the whole rational process." He speaks with admiration of Cardozo
who never rested on a formula, even one that embodied the most precious
victory of reason. The jurist must use lawyers' artifices as instruments
of judicial policy?0  But symbols mean only as much as conduct has put
into them,0 ' and the compulsion does not lie in the verbalism in which
judgment is cast. For the same economic motive may quicken disparate
clauses into action ;12 the same legal device serve to implement opposite
policies.0 3 In fact, since the law draws its juices from life and is not a
system of stagnation, its unfolding can reveal neither harmony in detail
nor logic in development. 4 A sprawling growth at times makes priestcraft
something of a necessity. The creative role of the Supreme Court in
interpreting the meaning of "the Delphic language of the Constitution"
must not become too obvious.6"
As cases come, a scheme of values resolves. And in resolution the
interpreter becomes the creator. As Bishop Hoadley has it, an absolute
authority makes the expositor the law-giver; 0 and, as Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes confesses, our fundamental instrument of government means
what the Supreme Court makes it mean. To Frankfurter it is not so much
a document as a stream of history. In his spacious view the instrument
was made, not at one time but on several occasions "8 and it owes its con-
tinuity to a process of revivifying change.0 9 It contains within itself the
formulated past and is designed for the unfolding future." Its provisions
are not mathematical formulas, but organic living institutions;1 their
significance is not formal but vital. 2 It is not a literary composition, nor
a document for fastidious dialectics,73 but the means of ordering the life
59. On Brandeis, pp. 105-106. 60. On Taney, p. 59.
61. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 482-3, 39 C(.L. L. REv. 112-3, 52 HRuv. L. RLV.
464-5.
62. On Waite, p. 75. 63. On Taney, p. 61.
64. On Taney, p. 66. 65. On Marshall, p, 25.
66. Quoting Bishop Hoadley, quoted in Gray, THE N.ATURE AND SOtVR(;:s oF Tnn
LAW (1921) 102; On Holmes II, p. 7.
67. THE COGMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937) 2.
68. On Marshall, p. 46. 69. On Brandeis, p. 103.
70. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 461, 39 COL. L. REv. 91, 52 HARV. L. R v. 443,
71. As 0. W. Holmes, Jr., became Mr. Justice Holmes, so much that was the com-
mon law became the Constitution. An assumption, by Taney, by Holmes, by Frankfurter
that our common law is the law of England helps to make it so.
72. Quoting Holmes, J., in Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 610 (1914);
On Holmes II, p. 77.
73. Within the meaning of words lie issues involving the future of society. Words
are to be interpreted in the light of our whole experience. See note 70, supra.
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of a progressive people. 4 It is a source of governmental energy as well
as of governmental restriction7" and its "power is as broad as the need
that invokes it."7  The Constitution has ample resources within itself
to meet the changing needs of successive generations. 77 In short it is
"not a printed finality but a dynamic process."
8
These are brave words- but general. They are of an amplitude to
allow the jurist his discretion.7 9 In more specific terms, and within their
contours, Frankfurter reveals urges of mind and spirit which impel
towards judgment. A dominant question, which the court must continu-
ously face, is the public control of business. As case follows case, the
question in controversy-in substance always the same - can be set
down in a variety of legal forms. It may be postulated as the police power
against due process of law, as the limits in individual freedom to the
province of government, as the rightful orbits of the legislature and the
judiciary, as social experimentation against constitutional restraint, as
the philosophy of laissez faire against a policy of collectivistic oversight,
as vested interest against the general welfare. In diverse questions Frank-
furter recognizes a common issue. He knows that at most the Constitu-
74. On Brandeis, p. 53; On Holmes I, p. 58; On Holmes II, p. 29. It is of note that
to Frankfurter American history is constitutional history. TnE C!urI.wZ CLts. s u:;u
MAR S LL, TANEY AND NVAITE (1937) 2.
75. See note 70, supra.
76. Quoting Cardozo, J., dissenting in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 293 U. S. 238,
328; On Cardozo, at 48 YAL.a L. J. 487, 39 CoL- L. REv. 117, 52 HAnv. L. RE%. 469.
77. Quoting James Bradley Thayer, On Brandeis, p. 53. Thayer has never lhd ade-
quate recognition as a Constitutional Father. Aside from his general influence as a
teacher and writer, he contributed directly to the stream of constitutional doctrine.
Holmes, J., was his associate; Moody and Brandeis, JJ., his students; Frankfurter, J.,
brought up in his tradition. His view of the spirit of the Constitution and the ampli-
tude of its competence for the changing necessities of a people is reflected in the opinions
of all these justices.
78. On Holmes II, p. 76. "What is the Constitution? A writing set down on parch-
ment in 1787 and some twenty-one times amended? Or a gloss of interpretation many
times the size of the original page? Or a corpus of exposition with which the original
text has been obscured? Or 'the supreme law of the land'-watever the United States
Supreme Court declares it to be? Or the voice of the people made articulate by a bench
of judges? Or an arsenal to be drawn upon for sanction as the occasion demands? Or a
piling up of the hearsay about its meaning in a long parade of precedents? Or a cluster
of abiding usages which hold government to its orbit and impose direction upon public
policy? Or 'a simple and obvious system of natural liberty' which even the national state
must honor and obey? And is the Constitution engrossed on parchment, set down in the
United States Reports or engraved in the folkwamys of a people? And . . . has the United
States a written or an unwritten Constitution ?"---alton H. Hamilton, z037 to 17S7 Dr.
in THE CoxTsiruTIox RECONSIDERED (1938) xv-xvi. Mr. Frankfurter would probably
accept "the gloss," doubt "the corpus," limit "natural liberty" to "civil rights" and answer
most of the questions in the affirmative. For him the United States has an unwritten as
well as a written Constitution.
79. The Constitution is "adequate." If it fails the necessities of the Pcople, the failure
stems from the narrowness of the men who interpret it. On Holmes II, p. 36.
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tion provides a ready formula whose terms must be weighted with the
stuff of life to secure judgment. For him decision must cut through
rhetorical statement and be grounded in the facts of the case and the
necessities of society. In answering one of these questions he will not
leave the others untouched.
In this varied clash of values he has made clear where the balance lies.
His advocacy of the shorter workday and the minimum wage are not
isolated commitments, ° but an expression of an articulate philosophy.
His tolerance of the legislature - in times past little short of militant -
extends far beyond personal conviction. To him the police power, true
to its etymology, is the power to shape policy."' It defies legal definition;
as a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to
a constitutional formula.8 2 The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving
cases, it must not fall back upon sterile cliches; its judgments are not to
derive from an abstract dialectic between liberty and the police power.
Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industry, it must
meet the challenge of drastic social change.8 3 For him, as for Holmes,
"society is more than bargain and business" and the jurist's art rises to
no higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented by the items
in a balance-sheet. 8' In a progressive society, new interests emerge, new
attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the tin-
known one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of
truth been brought up from its bottomless well;" and how fragile in
scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic adjust-
ment. Social development is a process of trial and error; in the making
of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of
the human mind." If Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez
faire - not the individual - must be the regulator."'
Discretion belongs where power is and knowledge resides. In economic
affairs, the penumbral region where law and policy blend, judges must
walk humbly. They must not measure tle legislature's reasons by their
own intellectual yardsticks;S8 translate their own doubts into judgments
of law; or confound personal disapproval into constitutional prohibi-
tion." The dry terms of abstract power are a constant temptation to
word-spinning and self-deception." Jurists must constantly be alert to
the treacherous appearance which the law gives to issues of fact, lest they
80. Briefs for the Appellees, Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917); Stettler v.
O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629 (1917) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
81. Police Power (1934) ENcyc. Soc. SCIENcES.
82. On Marshall, p. 27. 83. On Brandeis, p. 52.
84. On Holmes II, p. 91. 85. On Holmes II, p. 61.
86. On Holmes II, p. 50. 87. On Waite, p. 100.
88. Quoting Judge Hough, in Holmes II, p. 34.
89. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 462, 39 COL. L. REV. 92, 52 H,\Rv. L. REv. 444.
90. On Holmes II, p. 79.
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forget that legislation derives from actuality and get lost in the fog of
obstruction." Long, long ago Marshall himself characterized the power
of the courts to sit in judgment upon legislative acts as a "delicate
function." 2
The judge must meet glib terms which invite judicial discretion with
a stern caveat. The words of nullity at hand are alluring but vague in
outline and uncertain of meaning. The Constitution enjoins the equal
protection of the laws; but its essence of fairness neither derives from
hollow abstractions nor drives to judgment pedantic arguments."' An
infinite variety presents an ever new detail ;" the clause cannot be applied
with delusive exactness. Here no absolute is adequate;" constitutional
issues become questions of more or less, matters of fine lines and delicate
degrees. 96 To expect uniformity in law where there is diversity in fact
is mischievousY7 In a situation in which things are unlike, acts of state
are not to be struck down in the name of "fictitious inequalities.13
So, too, with due process. Legislative power is pent in by no doctrinaire
formula;9 it is to be cabined by no imprisoning definition of its allow-
able scope.' 0 If facts and symbols clash, it is the business of the court
to harmonize the talk of the cases with business actualities.10' Liberty
of contract is an alien doctrine which came out of economics into the
Constitution; and, as Holmes has insisted, due process is only the bench's
way of voicing its preference for laissez faire.0 2 Its invocation must not
force the court to define the police power. To him, as to Learned Hand,
the requirement of due process is merely an embodiment of the English
sporting idea of fair play.
At a number of strategic points Frankfurter's attitude is no deep
secret. He is persuaded that on the labor front fair play requires "that
equality in position between the parties in which liberty of contract
begins."' 0 3 The conditions of employment and the remuneration of the
workers cannot safely be left to the free play of economic forces within
the market. A corrective in labor standards must be supplied, either by
the trade union or by the legislature. If liberty of contract is to shape
terms of employment, the law must be broad enough to make of collective
bargaining an effective instrument and the labor injunction must be
91. On Waite, p. 84.
92. On Cardozo, at 48 Y-ALE L. J. 473, 39 COL. L. rPv. 103, 52 HARv. L. RE%. 455.
93. On Brandeis, p. 66. 94. On Holnes I, p. 64.
95. On Brandeis, p. 117.
96. On Brandeis, p. 96; On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 474, 39 COr. L RE%,. 104,
52 HA~v. L. R-v. 456.
97. On Brandeis, p. 65. 98. On Waite, p. 75.
99. On Holmes II, p. 42. 100. On Waite, p. 87.
101. On Taney, p. 65. 102. On Waite, p. 75.
103. Quoting Holmes, J., dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1915);
On Holmes I, p. 86.
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severely limited to the protection of public rights.104 But if, for want of
organization, workers lack bargaining strength, the government has an
obligation to secure their well-being. 1°4 As an interest within the common-
wealth their status is of conscious public concern. Here a host of problems
break in a tangle of legal issues, whose formal concern is cause of ac-
tion,' jurisdiction, procedure, statutory interpretation, the law of the
constitution. Frankfurter will consider such issues within their judicial
setting; he will accord full due to all the proprieties of legal usage. But
his values - set in an intellectual system that brooks no divisions between
the social and the legal- will shape his judgments.
Along the business frontier his views are less fortified by long study
and concrete experience. But sign posts are already set from which as
occasion demands he may get his judicial bearings, It is an easy step
from a legal minimum wage to the constitutionality of legislative price
control. Here time hurries, bothers press, legislation cannot wait for
accord among economists or general acceptance of their theories. Here
"powerful forces produce problems which must be dealt with by legisla-
tors with whatever fallible and tentative wisdom they possess." ' ,0 Here
Frankfurter accepts the judgment of the court in Nebbia's'08 and rejects
its decision in Carter's case.' 09 Thus he refuses to recognize any fixed cate-
gory of industries affected with a public interest, to elevate price above
other terms of the bargain, or to create for business a zone of legislative
immunity." 0
On public utilities Frankfurter's position is fully abreast the most
advanced rulings of the court. He is critical, in theory and application
alike, of cost of reproduction new. He finds the formula a temptation
to economic legerdemain, a most luxuriant means for creating fictitious
values,"' an indulgence in constitutional metaphysics about valuation. He
insists that the grab-bag nature of the rule of Smyth v. Ames" 2 must
104. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). It is well known
that Mr. Frankfurter was instrumental in shaping the provisions of the Norris Act.
105. On Holmes II, pp. 9-45.
106. The cause of action is the most conventional of things. A society will impress
its dominant values upon the pattern. As the labor interest wins recognition, the courts
will serve it in continuing new causes of action. Along this neglected front the Courts
have always done-and will continue to do-creative work.
107. On Cardozo. at 48 YALE L. J. 470, 39 CoL. L. REV. 100, 52 HAnv. L, Ri V, 452.
108. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
109. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
110. The court did not succeed in reconciling the two judgments, and Frankfurter
does not attempt to do so. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 471-4, 487-8, 30 COL. L, Rix,
101-4, 117-8, 52 HARV. L. REV. 453-7, 469-70.
111. On Brandeis, p. 76.
112. 169 U. S. 466 (1898). In the case of Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co. (No.
509, Oct. Term, 1938), the Department of Justice as anicus curiae has ju.t filed with
the Supreme Court a brief asking to have Smytl v. Ames overruled.
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presently drive the court in fact, if not in form, to the doctrine of prudent
investment. A price policy, even in respect to public utilities, involves
many considerations other than the value of property.' But even
prudent investment is an injunction against experimental rate-making;
and it remains to be seen whether Frankfurter is willing to accord to
the commission the opportunity he does not withhold from the legis-
lature. He may even insist that, since the cause at law cannot compre-
hend all the factors, rate cases should be dismissed for want of juris-
diction." 4 For he professes unwillingness to substitute judicial judgment
for administrative judgment in the face of the "obscurity which envelops
the economic process."' 5
At the moment all is excitement along the administrative front. As a
specialist in administrative law Frankfurter is conversant with the march
of events and the emerging issues. He recognizes the increasing com-
plexity of modem life, the changing wants of the people, the enlarged
offices of the government, the demand for a detailed accommodation of
controls to situations, the necessity for lodging discretion hard by the
facts. He is willing to accord to administrative bodies, within their
statutory domains, an independence adequate to their social duties. He
is not likely to lend concurrence to the doctrine of the non-delegation
of power which, in the "hot oil" and "the industrial code" cases,"06 came
out of nothingness into constitutional law and disappeared as mysteri-
ously as it came. He will as certainly prove hospitable to the informality
of procedures which these agencies must be allowed to adopt as he will
be loath to permit them "to disregard evidence or dispense with the logic
of relevance.""' 7
Even more fundamental is Frankfurter's basic attitude towards the
administrative process. It is easy enough, with Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
to approach the matter as an adversary proceeding, to look upon the
utility as a person awaiting judgment, and to accord to "the accused"
all the perquisites of due process. But such a procedure mistakes the
very nature of the problem." 8 The matter at issue is a continuing rela-
tion between the concern which furnishes the services and the consumers
who must foot the bills. The task of the commission is to insert terms
of the bargain when no market is there to turn the trick. Hence a con-
113. It is, of course, evident that a question in price policy was whittled down into
an issue of the valuation of property to meet the requirements of judicial challenge under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
114. Note Black, J., dissenting, in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419
(1938).
115. On Brandeis, p. 79.
116. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Scledter Poultry Co. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
117. On Brandeis, p. 121.
118. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
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tractual approach to the problem is legally as plausible as one grounded
in criminal law and civil rights - and far more relevant. For in pro-
crastination over a procedural due process, the rights of the public- an
equal party to the bargain - are likely to be forgotten. After all, the
task- alike of commission and court- is to fix the terms of a con-
tract; and here the procedures of business are rather more relevant than
those of litigation.11 Assuredly here, if anywhere, "to deny the govern-
ment the right to act," unless it can act "with omniscience and prescience"
is "to deny it the right to act at all."' 20
But the years pass - and the constitutional battle moves to a new
front. In the emergent future questions are likely to turn far more upon
somewhat more or less, the concretions of usage, the precisions of regu-
lation.' 2' As yet the impact of the modern corporation' 22 has been
assimilated neither by the law nor into public policy. Corporations are
creatures of the several states, yet operate in a national economy. They
are instruments of individual or collective purpose, yet persons at law and
in equity. We know that Frankfurter is willing to admit differences
between individual and corporate enterprise and to distinguish coopera-
tives from ordinary profit-seeking venture. 23 But the public law of the
corporation is to be woven from very fine strands; and, save for general
values which he will bring to his task, his writings tell little of the deign
he would impose.
Nor is his attitude to the anti-trust acts a matter of concrete record.
He does not regard all concentration of economic power as a decree of
nature nor even as the inevitable consequence of modern technology. But
he is not likely to read the Sherman Act as a call to "a policy of anarchic
laissez faire."'24 He is much too skeptical of the principles of economics
and much too wary of the laws of trade regulation to assume that specific
cases can be disposed of by an easy reference to rules. In respect alike
to the corporation and the combination his way is almost certain to be
that of the concrete instance. He will be sensitive to social tensions and
conflicts of interest; he will keep himself informed about the processes
of government and of industry.' 5 He will bring to judgment an alert-
ness to the concentration of economic power and a devotion to the egali-
tarian hopes for American society which stem from Jefferson, Jackson
and Lincoln."2"
Beyond this, along the industrial front, all is less certain. At the
moment a curious paradox attends the status of due process. As civil
119. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATV PROCESS (1938) 8-10.
120. On Cardozo, loc. cit. supra note 110.
121. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937) 8.
122. On Taney, p. 63. 123. On Brandeis, p. 69.
124. On Brandeis, p. 119.
125. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 462, 39 COL. L. REv. 92, 52 HARv. L. Rrv. 444.
126. On Taney, p. 63.
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rights are read into the classic words, liberty of contract departs its
verbal home. In reaction to the late bench which struck down acts of
Congress at will, the current court severely maintains its self-denying
ordinance. If all statutes were social legislation, prompted by the necessi-
ties of a people, all would be well. But lobbies are often more than a
third house and a plague of measures which enthrone privilege is sweep-
ing the land. As favors are accorded to special interests and as the
channels of economic opportunity are blocked, a struggle is on between
the equal protection of the laws and the prevailing doctrine of judicial
self-restraint. A formula, even one that is an expression of judicial
humility, may drift from the cause it was meant to serve. It may cease
to be a support to the general welfare and become a bulwark to those who
would make even the law a card in an acquisitive game." -  It is one
thing to insist that as applied to diverse conditions, equal protection is
an abstraction; it is quite another to withhold its protection when rights
are accorded to some and denied to others.2 8 Yet the current trends run
strongly towards the finality of legislative judgment.' -3
A kindred problem of opportunity and privilege is presented by patents.
With technology in the saddle, access to the industrial arts is an essential
of free enterprise. The inventor's right - from which as often as not
he is excluded -has been elaborated into a vast network of intangible
entities. As Frankfurter ascends the bench the law of patents is back-
ward. A product largely of private litigation, it reflects far too little the
127. At the moment the Court is fully, even austerely, committed to the ductrine of
judicial self-restraint. In the court the focal points all indicate as much. In an about
face, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes has led his court in a retreat from the peak of assumed
powers in 1935 and 1936. Mr. Justice Brandeis has long engaged in a campaign to uce
procedural and jurisdictional devices to keep constitutional issues from being raised. Note,
as typical, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923). Three years ago he
led a fight, lacking success by a single vote, to dispose of the case uf Ashwander v. T.VA.,
297 U. S. 288 (1936), by denying the right of the plaintiff to sue. See the recent decision
of the Court, by which Tenn. Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority [(1939)
6 U. S. L. IaaK 713] was disposed of by the denial that the plaintiffs had suffered any
wrong of which legally they could complain. A superb triumph fr his strategy attends him,
as Mr. Justice Brandeis leaves the bench. Mr. Justice Black, harking back to the early rul-
ings on due process, is likely to insist that even in respect to such legislative abuses as
these the remedy points to the polls rather than to the bencd. In such instances the judicial
service of the cause of liberalism is likely to be left to McReynu!ds and Butler, JJ. Tiat
is, unless new members of the bench depart from the liberalism now established.
128. Undertakers, barbers, photographers, beauty-parlor srecialists, and a host of
others, are analogyzing their trades to the learned professions, securing uniform acts
from state legislatures, and hedging themselves against competition by legal protection.
See Comment (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 847.
129. A number of factors, within the Court and without, give current support to a
constitutional attitude. Note the reaction in this country to the totalitarian state which
strengthens confidence in the finality of legislative judgment since the legislature is a
democratic institution. Air. Frankfurter's attitude towards the European situation is not
a thing apart from his general philosophy.
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public interest. Holdings are given currency when no attorney would
have the temerity to present citations on monopoly, employers' liability, or
collective bargaining from the same vintage. Upon this issue these essays
by the new justice are silent. But, in other connections, he praises Marshall
and Waite for providing an ample constitutional frame for the develop-
ment of the railroads, for keeping free the channels of national enter-
prise, for helping to release energies of national life.13 In a return to
constitutional intent, such enduring values can be served only by a revision
of the corpus of patent law.1
31
As for state v. nation Frankfurter is a federalist rather than a nation-
alist. He envisages a nation adequate to its larger duties, made up of
states, each with ample power for the diverse uses of a civilized people.
132
It is true that all our activities have been caught up into a great industrial
system, and that "commerce is a web of state and interstate activities."
But it is not a seamless web, for the reserved power of the states and
the commerce power of the nation together imply recognition of legal
disparateness even where logical unity can be established.133 The organic
nature of society is not a decree of constitutional centralization and the
states ought not to be hampered in dealing with evils at their points of
pressure.13 4 Even amidst 'the complexity of modern industry they must
have the amplest opportunity for local development. Still the matter must
not be pushed too far; national power must not be mutilated or paralyzed
by sterile abstraction or by distinctions that do not respond to the actuali-
ties of modern industry. 3 Neither state nor nation must be enjoined
from using an experimental program to fulfil its responsibilities.
The commerce clause is a repository of national power. In drawing
upon it the bother is the constant temptation to logomachy. 130 As an
illusory generality, it is a henchman eager for its conscript duty. It gave
to Marshall an opportunity to restrain legislatures from hampering the
free play of a national commerce.' 3 7 Even though left dominant by
Congress he found in it an implicit veto with which to save the larger
economy from the particularism of the States. 38  To Taney the mere
grant imposed no limit upon the state's police power; it was, instead, an
authority for Congress to act.' 30 To Waite, always mindful of local
interests, it was proper for Illinois to regulate grain elevators, even though
130. On Marshall, pp. 35-39; On Waite, p. 76.
131. Note that the Constitution grants to Congress, not the power to issue letters
patent, but "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." The grant of patent
is only an instrument by which the progress of the industrial arts is to be encouraged.
132. On Holmes II, p. 93; On Brandeis, pp. 84-85, 100.
133. On Waite, p. 97.
134. On Brandeis, pp. 65, 85; On Holmes II, pp. 75, 93.
135. On Holmes II, pp. 76, 79, 93. 136. On Holmes I, p. 67.
137. On Marshall, p. 14. 138. On Marshall, pp. 16, 37.
139. On Taney, p. 50.
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they stood at the gates of a commerce which ignored state lines.1 " With
the state as the agency of control, the commerce clause has often meant
laissez faire- just as, when the nation has acted, states' rights have
meant laissez faire. As a symbol it may be employed by the judiciary to
secure for the states paralyzing authority over national interests or to
dry up all state power."
To Frankfurter such a term is no abstraction of logic -even of con-
stitutional logic. As a norm, directionless in itself, it is servant to its
master's result. The word commerce, drawn from the vocabulary of
business, is a practical, not a technical legal concept. 142 He has no quarrel
with 'Marshall whose notion reflected the Virginia resolution; he would
not deny to Congress authority to act in matters which are beyond the
competence of the several states.'14 He would never hem in commerce
by a formula concerned with the physical movement of goods. His
conception is functional, not mechanistic; he speaks with never the trace
of an accent the language of the organic relation of commercial trans-
actions.14 4 If a metaphor must be used, he prefers - because of its cre-
ative implications - "the stream of commerce." The Fathers who granted
to Congress the regulation of commerce among the several states, were
too wise to attempt its definition, its scope was not to be confined within
the bounds of their experience;145 its changing contours were to be deter-
mined by a dynamic national economy, it was set down for an undefined
and expanding future.'4  To Frankfurter the clause is a constant source
of fresh authority - and commerce among the several states is the
national economy.
Where, then, is the line to be drawn between national and state au-
thority? Frankfurter is far too sensitive to the integrity of the industrial
system to attempt to disentangle orbits and to define provinces. The
metaphor of two powers, each a sovereign within its own dominion, is
not for him. Instead, taking his cue from the Constitution, he makes
the question a simple matter of precedence. If Congress has acted, then
the law of the United States is the supreme law of the land 14 T -and the
140. Mlunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1,77). 141. On Holmes II, p. 80.
142. On Holmes II, p. 79; On Marshall, p. 42.
143. On Marshall, pp. 41-42. The sixth resolution of the Virginia Plan, introduced
in the Constitutional convention by Edmund Randolph, provided that the Congress wvas
"to legislate in all cases in which the several states are incompetent or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."
144. On Marshall, p. 42; On Taney, p. 60.
145. The experience of the framers was broad enough to identify "commerce" with
the money economy. See HAMILTON AND ADm, THE Powu "o GommIN (1937). The
narrowing of the concept came later.
146. On Waite, p. 104-105.
147. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every
19391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
states must yield.14 If Congress has not occupied the field, the act of the
state is not to be sacrificed to the unexpressed will of the national legis-
lature. The silence of Congress is no invitation to judicial authority 40
For its invasion of the individualism of the states is costly and capri-
cious, 5° stops experimentation, bars needed increase in the fund of social
knowledge, and involves jurists in matters not peculiarly within their
competence.' Yet, when the game is on, and nation disputes jurisdic-
tion with state, then the Supreme Court must attend diligently to its
office of umpiring the federal system. A clash of public wills, brought
into an imperfect accord, may be something of a makeshift. But govern-
ment itself is something of a makeshift - and until the coming of Utopia
we must put up with compromise. 5 2 The end will be - as often it has
been -to impose artificial patterns upon the play of economic life.'
None the less our federalism, as a means to an ordered social life, is worth
all it costs.' 5 4
In taxation the same issue is posed and receives an identical answer.
The aims of taxation cannot be crowded into so simple a term as the
raising of revenue. As society has become urban nd industrial, the
government has been compelled to seek the wherewithal with which to
carry out newly assumed obligations. Its policy is experimental. What-
ever its nature, an impost can hardly exclude social consequences - and
the complexities of tax legislation are intensified wherever social policy
is its predominant aim. 55 It is a difficult task to tap new sources of
revenue without killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. In the face
of the enormous diversity in types of business activity, nice calculations
are involved in making classifications at once fair and effective.' The
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." ART. VI, 1f 2.
148. On Brandeis, p. 91.
149. He is rather critical of Marshall for using against the states a national author-
ity still dormant; "an exclusive commerce power could not be rigorously applied without
changing the whole political character of the states."-On Marshall, p. 27. He concurs
with Taney that for "the safety and convenience of trade, or for the protection of the
health of its citizens," the states may make regulations for commerce-even in respect to
ports and harbors-so far as they do not come into conflict with a law of Congress.-On
Taney, p. 51. He records that "the abstraction of exclusive power in Congress in vauno"
was uncongenial to Waite's pragmatic mind; yet admits with him that once Congress had
translated constitutional powers into policy, full scope was to be given to its action.--On
Waite, p. 101.
150. It need hardly be added that such a conviction cuts athwart much current con-
stitutional usage. Yet it runs deep with Mr. Frankfurter.
151. On Holmes II, p. 88.
152. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. 3. 463, 39 COL. L. Rav. 93, 52 HARV. L. REV. 445.
153. On Marshall, p. 21. 154. On Taney, p. 66.
155. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 466, 39 COL. L. Rav. 96, 52 NARv. L. Ray. 448.
156. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L J. 464, 39 COL. L. Ray. 94, 52 HARv. L. REv. 446.
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bite of a tax case is in its particular circumstances.-' Yet the whole
matter is an elusive riddle and the fog of doubt and confusion has not
been lifted by economists. There is at hand no legal litmus to give ready
answers; legislative judgment must not be curtailed by judicial intrusion
into the domain of policy; the Constitution must play no "preferences
between competing theories."'Ii s
Here Frankfurter is unwilling to open the door to judicial policy making
wider than the Constitution obviously requires. If it expressly limits
state power, the restriction must be enforced with scrupulous vigor. But,
as with police measures, state taxing acts are not to be struck down or
abridged by any implied prohibition in the commerce clause. 1' On the
contrary, subject as they are to popular control, the states must be allowed
the widest latitude." 0' Their empirical policies must be hampered by "no
finicky limitation upon their discretion nor jejune formula of equality.""0 t
The fictions by which immunities to taxation are clinched have little hold
on his mind. 1 2 In contemplation of the abstraction that the source of
the income is the salary of a state official, Frankfurter is not likely to
forget that the tax-payer is a citizen of the United States.1C3 He will
be prone to define with extreme narrowness the immunity conferred by
tax exempt securities. '0 4 Where state and federal levies clash, he would
do his judicial best to avoid conflict before deciding that the latter should
yield. In short, for a modern society, in which parts are organically
related, his fundaments are the rejection of verbalisms, the spirit of
accommodation, the reconciliation of contradictions.10 5
In the article on civil rights his creed readies its pinnacle. A line about
his predecessor is prophetic of eloquence in opinions to come. In matters
economic Cardozo walked humbly; but where the ethical precepts embodied
in the Bill of Rights were invoked, lie responded "as one whose constant
companion was reason and whose life was rooted in moral law."' c' Frank-
157. See note 160, infra.
158. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 467, 39 COL. L REv. 97, 52 HAr. L RE%. 449.
159. On Taney, pp. 54-56.
160. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE J. L. 468-9, 39 CoL- L. REv. 98-9, 52 Hiv. L. Rrn.
450-1.
161. Ibid.
162. "Mr. Justice Holmes did not have a curmudgeon's feelings about his own taxes.
A secretary who exclaimed, 'Don't you hate to pay taxes!' as rebuked with the hot
response, 'No, young fellow, I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization.' "-On
Holmes II, p. 42.
163. Such a position is well in advance of the latest line taken by the Supreme Court
in its drive against immunity. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 5S Sup. Ct. 969 (U. S. 1938). The
argument likewise holds for the citizen of the state who draws his income from federal
office. In a brief, just filed for the United States as anicus curiae, the Solicitor-General
concedes the point.
164. On Brandeis, p. 56. 165. On Holmes II, p. 84.
166. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 479, 39 CO. L. REv. 109, 52 H.v. L. Rzv. 461.
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furter defends Holmes and Cardozo alike when they elevate the authority
of the legislature above freedom of contract, yet make it yield before
freedom of speech.'07 In matters of economics there is no authoritative
fund of social wisdom to be drawn upon; the history of civilization is
the displacement of truths by truths which in time have yielded to other
truths. For that very reason the liberty of men to search for truth is of
a different order from any economic dogma even if it is defined as a
sacred right.' "Liberty is a greater good than efficiency" ;101 human
interests are of such dignity that the good judge never imprisons them
in the subtle mesh of procedural technicality.1 70 The very heart of the
Constitution is the Bill of Rights; and the Constitution is the product
of the Age of Reason. 7'
To Frankfurter, as to Holmes, "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas"; and "the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 17
A sense of history teaches us to prefer the risks of tolerance to the
dangers of tyranny. 73 The liberties defined by our Bill of Rights are,
on the whole, more living realities in the daily lives of Englishmen with-
out any formed constitution because they are part of the national habit;
they are in the marrow of the bones of the people.' 74 But there is no
freedom without choice and there is no choice without knowledge. The
valid test for freedom is the spirit of inquiry which keeps open the indis-
pensable conditions of intelligent e-xperimentation1'7 The real test of
belief in "the freedom to believe" is to allow it to men whose opinions
seem to you wrong or even dangerous. 1
76
At this point the heritage of the past is enlisted in the service of the
future. We are an economic, as well as a political, community. As
respects affairs of government a universal manhood suffrage is a half-
way house; to become effective it must have its counterpart in individual
167. Note the contrast between O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Insurance Co.,
282 U. S. 251 (1936), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). See Shulman,
The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Liberty of Contract and Freedomn of Speech (1931)
41 YALE L. J. 262.
168. On Holmes II, pp. 50-51; On Cardozo, loc. cit. supra note 166.
169. On Brandeis, p. 115.
170. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 481, 39 COL. L. REV. 111, 52 HAgv. L. REXv. 463.
171. On Brandeis, p. 115. 172. On Holmes I, p. 74.
173. On Holmes I, p. 72.
174. On Holmes II, p. 63. Note here, and elsewhere, Mr. Frankfurter's admiration
for the English political system. His respect for parliamentary government is clearly
evident in his attitude towards judicial review.
175. Quoting Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holiues, 44 HARv. L. REV. 682, 688; On Cardozo,
p. 480. "To misrepresent fact is to corrupt the source of opinion."-On Brandeis, p. 110,
176. Quoting Scrutton, L.J., in Rex v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1923]
2 K. B. 361, 382; On Brandeis, p. 106.
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liberty within the industrial order. In fact an office of the state is to
bring "to the masses economic freedom commensurate with their politi-
cal freedom.""' Public policy must voice with a new vitality the claims
of civilization as expressed by constitutional protection to civil liberties. 17 8
Groups within society have newly become articulate within the common-
wealth; a sympathetic attitude towards their aspirations was a presumption
of Frankfurter's appointment. Here he takes his stand upon ancient
ground and reaches out after fresh doctrine. The ordinance of the Con-
stitution may be enduring; but "old principles have creative energies for
new situations.''17
These are Frankfurter's articles of faith. It is a humane creed. As
it shapes the contours of his judgments, the new justice will give it
urbane expression. He is no dull pedant, to whom literacy is distaste-
ful; the telling phrase and the overtone of meaning, anathema. He stands
in the tradition of Holmes and Cardozo. He knows that style is sub-
stance; words, tokens of the thing's identity. For him "humdrum, mat-
ter-of-fact, dry, lawyer's English" does not carry a judge's reputation
down the stream of history."'0 It is artistic sensibility which imports the
touch of charm, colors the quality and makes the difference. Language
is a sword whose utility depends upon its disciplined use.18' Figures of
speech alone can lift legal rhetoric above aridity; yet, unless deftly em-
ployed, they are "dangerous instruments of constitutional law."' 82 The
idiom of Frankfurter -replete with various figures which call for free-
dom and cry-out against all that narrows, imprisons, or isolates from the
forces of life -is a reflection of the very character of the man.
Thus, equipped with articles of faith, Frankfurter goes to his task.
Far more often than not his voice will be merged in the opinion of the
court. The cutting edge of personal conviction will be fully apparent only
in separate concurrence or in dissent. But official utterance is the com-
bined work of individual influences made articulate through an institution
which has its usages. To persons blessed with insight, life which stems
from persons "may be found to stir beneath the decorous surface of
unanimous opinions."''  In spite of the austerity which insulates the
Supreme Court from knowledge of its intimate life, the impact of his
creed is likely to remain transparent. His philosophy will find play beneath
177. On Holmes II, p. 49.
178. On Cardozo, loc. cit. supra note 166.
179. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 477, 39 COL L. REv. 107, 52 HAmv. L RLv. 495.
180. On Waite, p. 79.
181. The judge must not, of course, allow the temptation of a lively style to betray
him into gratuitous rhetoric, nor permit a triumph of eloquence over detail.-On Waite,
p. 101.
182. On Brandeis, p. 91.
183. THE COMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND VArM (1937) 9.
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the formal surface of litigation;... his judgments, like those of other
jurists, will derive atmospheric support from the general body of his
constitutional views."85
In a myriad of subtle forms, within the recondite legal arrangements
of our federalism, a new jurist faces his problems. It is rare that one has
mounted the Supreme bench so consciously aware of the task which
awaits him. Frankfurter has had enough contact with affairs to sense
their restless quality. As no appointee before him, he knows the law of
the Constitution and his court. He is acquainted with its annals, has
examined its changing functions, has appraised its procedures, opinions,
and judgments. He has brought to his studies a high regard for its office
in the political system and the national economy. He has exhibited an
appreciative and a critical attitude towards its work. In a sense his life
has been a preparation for'the responsibilities he now assumes.
The law is no respector of persons. A man, howsoever steeped in its
distinctive righteousness, can expect only within reason to live up to his
creed. It is too much to hope that- amid the din of controversy, the
hurry of the docket, the decorous usages of the bench, the variety of
causes, the multiple ways of putting the question, the conflict of pressures
and of values -human frailty can measure up to such a profession. But
if the new jurist allows his "liberalism" to be frozen into a formula, lie
can understand the disposition which the law reviews will exhibit to lay
on. For Felix Frankfurter himself has provided to Mr. Justice Frank-
furter a standard of personal performance in a new set of "Lines of a
Good Judge."
To many men it comes to say it; to the new jurist it is given to prove
to us that the law "becomes more civilized as it becomes more self-
conscious."186
184. On Cardozo, at 48 YALE L. J. 459, 39 COL. L. REv. 89, 52 HARV. L. REv. 441.
185. On Marshall, p. 46. 186. On Marshall, p. 31.
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